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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 24, 2004, the United States Supreme Court created 
uncertainty and confusion in the criminal justice system regarding 
sentencing at both the state and federal levels with the decision of 
Blakely v. Washington.1  Suddenly, doubt was cast on the 
constitutionality and continued validity of sentencing guidelines in 
state and federal court systems that utilized guidelines.2  However, 
the Supreme Court was clear on several issues.  First, determinate 
sentencing structures themselves are not unconstitutional.3  
Second, sentencing guidelines are also not per se unconstitutional.4  
Third, enhanced sentences and plea agreements are constitutional 
when certain procedures are in place to ensure the defendants’ 
constitutional rights.5 
While the decision of Blakely v. Washington does not directly 
impact the constitutionality or the structure of the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines, it does affect certain sentencing procedures 
pertaining to aggravated departures and specific sentence 
enhancements.6  State v. Shattuck and State v. Houston are examples 
of decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court that leave the door 
open for possible constitutional attacks on certain enhancing 
statutes while at the same time determining that the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines are constitutional.7 
After discussing the facts and decisions of Shattuck and 
Houston, this Article gives background information on the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.8  It then gives background on 
the landmark cases of Blakely v. Washington and its predecessor, 
Apprendi v. New Jersey.9  Next, it discusses the impact these decisions 
 
 1. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 4. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 5. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 6. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 7. See discussion infra Parts II, IV. 
 8. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 9. See discussion infra Part III.B, III.C. 
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have had on other states with presumptive sentencing guidelines.10  
Finally, this Article addresses how the Shattuck and Houston 
decisions will impact the criminal justice system in Minnesota state 
courts.11 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASES 
A. State v. Shattuck 
1. Facts 
Robert Shattuck was arrested for the suspected rape of 
seventeen-year-old R.E. on January 30, 2001.12  R.E. was walking 
home after getting off a bus in south Minneapolis, when a man 
pushing a bicycle approached her from behind, threatened her, 
and forced her to walk down an alley and then proceeded to 
sexually assault her.13  Shattuck was quickly held to be the main 
suspect in the case.14  Shattuck subsequently fled to Georgia after 
his picture was shown on television in connection with the crime; 
he was arrested there on an unrelated offense.15  At trial, the State 
introduced substantial circumstantial evidence, as well as DNA 
evidence linking Shattuck to the crime.16 
2. The District Court 
During the jury instruction conference, Shattuck argued that, 
under Apprendi v. New Jersey,17 any aggravating factor that could 
render an enhanced sentence under the Minnesota repeat sex 
offender statute needed to be decided by the jury.18  The court 
 
 10. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 11. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 12. State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Minn. 2005). 
 13. Id.  The man took twenty-five dollars from R.E.’s wallet before he 
penetrated R.E vaginally with his fingers and penis causing her pain.  Id.  When 
R.E. asked him to stop, the man threatened her again and continued.  Id.  After 
the man was finished, he punched R.E. in the face, breaking her jaw.  Id.  The man 
told R.E. that if she told anybody he would kill her.  Id. 
 14. Id.  Shattuck worked at a nearby restaurant and had gotten off work 
shortly before the assault.  Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  Apprendi is discussed in detail infra Part III.B. 
 18. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 134. 
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denied this request and Shattuck was subsequently found guilty of 
two counts of kidnapping, two counts of first-degree criminal 
sexual conduct, and one count of first-degree aggravated robbery.19 
When Shattuck committed the offense, first-degree criminal 
sexual conduct and kidnapping with great bodily harm were both 
Severity Level Eight offenses under the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines.20  The presumptive guideline sentence was a range of 
156 to 166 months with Shattuck’s criminal history score of nine.21  
The trial court sentenced Shattuck to the presumptive 161-month 
sentence for the kidnapping as well as an enhanced sentence of a 
360-month term for the first-degree criminal sexual conduct 
pursuant to Minnesota’s repeat sex offender statute,22 due to four 
aggravating factors being present in the crime.23 
3. The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Shattuck’s sentence, 
stating that the trial court “acted within its discretion in finding 
that aggravating factors provided a sufficient basis for sentencing 
Shattuck under a mandatory-minimum-sentencing statute, and that 
decision did not violate the holding of Apprendi.”24  The court based 
its argument on State v. McCoy,25 which held that Apprendi applies 
only to situations in which a court sentences a defendant to a term 
that exceeds the statutory maximum.26  Blakely was then decided 
while Shattuck’s petition for review was pending.27 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  See infra Part III.A. for a discussion of the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines. 
 21. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 134. 
 22. The repeat sex offender statute provides that for certain forms of first- 
and second-degree criminal sexual conduct, the district court shall commit the 
defendant for no less than thirty years if it finds that (1) an aggravating factor 
exists and (2) the defendant has a previous conviction for criminal sexual conduct 
in the first, second, or third degrees.  MINN. STAT. § 609.109, subd. 4(a) (2004). 
 23. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 134-35.  The court found four aggravating factors: 
(1) the victim was particularly vulnerable, (2) the victim was treated with particular 
cruelty, (3) the victim suffered great emotional harm, and (4) the assault was 
planned.  Id. 
 24. Id. (citing State v. Shattuck, No. 01011914, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 349, 
at *19 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2004)). 
 25. 631 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 26. Shattuck, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 349, at *19. 
 27. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 135. 
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4. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that, based on the jury 
verdict alone, Shattuck was only subject to a presumptive sentence 
of 161 months.28  When the trial court found that aggravating 
factors existed in the crime, providing grounds to impose the 
mandatory minimum thirty-year sentence, it violated Shattuck’s 
Sixth Amendment right to have a jury make that determination 
upon a reasonable-doubt standard.29  The court’s decision thereby 
rendered Minnesota Statutes section 609.109, subdivision 4 
unconstitutional in its entirety,30 while the unconstitutional section 
of Minnesota Sentencing Guideline II.D was severable from its 
constitutional sections.31 
While the Minnesota Supreme Court was deciding Shattuck, 
the Minnesota Legislature acted to make sure various Minnesota 
statutes complied with Apprendi and Blakely.32  The Minnesota 
Legislature amended Minnesota Statutes section 609.109, 
subdivision 4 to require the factfinder, rather than the court, to 
determine whether aggravating factors exist that would provide 
grounds for a mandatory thirty-year sentence as a repeat sex 
offender.33  The Shattuck court took note of these amendments and 
stated that “we express no opinion about these recent changes.”34 
 
 28. Id. at 142. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 142-42.  Without the unconstitutional provision, the statute is 
incomplete and incapable of being executed.  Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 645.20 
(2004). 
 31. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 144.  The court determined that Minnesota 
Sentencing Guideline II.D is unconstitutional only insofar as it allows the district 
court to impose an upward departure based on judicial findings.  Id.  The court 
did not believe that the remaining provisions in the guidelines are “so essentially 
and inseparably connected with, and so dependant upon” the unconstitutional 
provision that without it, the remaining provisions would not have been enacted.  
Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.20).  This is mainly based on the Blakely decision, 
which focuses on the procedure of judicial fact-finding for upward departures 
rather than the substance of determinate sentencing.  Id. 
 32. S.F. No. 2273, 84th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2005). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 148 n.16. 
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B. State v. Houston 
1. Facts 
Gerald Houston was convicted of one count of an attempted 
first-degree controlled substance crime as well as one count of a 
fifth-degree controlled substance crime on October 10, 2001.35  The 
presumptive guideline sentence for these crimes was eighty and 
one-half months.36  The district court departed from the 
presumptive guidelines, based on the Minnesota Career Offender 
Statute, and sentenced Houston to 270 months.37  After the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Houston’s upward departure 
from the presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines, he attempted to collaterally challenge the sentence 
through the process of postconviction review.38  The postconviction 
court upheld Houston’s sentence; however, while his appeal of that 
decision was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Blakely.39 
2. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
In State v. Houston, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined 
that Blakely could be applied retroactively to cases on direct review, 
but not to cases on collateral review.40  The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals ruled that Houston was unable to utilize Blakely because 
the case announced a new rule of constitutional criminal 
procedure and Houston had exhausted all means of direct appeal 
at the time Blakely was decided.41 
 
 35. State v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 269 (Minn. 2005).  Houston possessed 
in his motor vehicle items necessary to manufacture methamphetamine.  Id.; see 
MINN. STAT. §§ 152.021, subd. 2(a), 609.17, 152.025, subd. 2(1). 
 36. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270.  Houston’s sentence was based on a severity 
level of eight and a criminal history score of seven.  For a discussion of the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, see infra Part III.A. 
 37. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 269-70.  The trial court found that (1) Houston 
had been convicted of at least five previous crimes, and (2) the current crime was 
committed as “part of a pattern of criminal behavior.”  Id. at 270; see MINN. STAT. § 
609.1095, subd. 4. 
 38. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 270-71.  Once a defendant has exhausted all of his remedies in state 
courts, he is allowed to make constitutional challenges through the postconviction 
review process.  MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subd. 1.  Houston held that Blakely could be 
applied retroactively to a case that was pending on direct appeal, not on appeal 
from a denial of postconviction relief.  Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 273. 
 41. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270.  Houston was denied relief on direct review 
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Pursuant to the mandates of retroactivity jurisprudence,42 a 
new rule does not apply once all direct appeals have been 
exhausted.43  Furthermore, the court determined that Blakely does 
not announce a “watershed”44 rule and is thus not subject to 
retroactive application on collateral review.45  In order for a rule to 
be considered watershed, it must be one without which “the 
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished,” and 
one that is essential to the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding.46  The court determined that a Blakely violation only 
requires a remand for resentencing rather than a new trial to 
determine the validity of the conviction.47  When a Blakely violation 
is made, the likelihood of an accurate conviction is not seriously 
diminished, making the rule not one of watershed magnitude.48 
Houston further claimed that the Apprendi line of cases 
requires that all sentencing factors that increase the penalty beyond 
the punishment available based solely on the jury verdict or guilty 
plea be treated as underlying elements of the offense.49  Because 
elements of an offense must be placed in the charging instrument, 
submitted to a jury, and found beyond a reasonable doubt, treating 
sentencing factors as elements implicates “bedrock procedural 
 
by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, and denied review by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court.  Id.  The postconviction court also upheld Houston’s sentence.  Id.  This 
action was an appeal from the postconviction court decision.  Id. 
 42. In Minnesota, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), is used to determine 
the retroactivity of federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure.  O’Meara v. 
State, 679 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn. 2004).  Under Teague, the court first 
determines if the rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure is new.  
Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270.  If the rule is considered new, it will be applied to all 
cases pending on direct review.  Id.  If the defendant has exhausted all means of 
direct appeal, that defendant will not be able to petition for certiorari.  Id. 
  Teague stated that a rule of constitutional criminal procedure is new if it is 
not “dictated” by precedent.  489 U.S. at 301.  The test is whether “reasonable 
jurists hearing petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became final ‘would 
have felt compelled by existing precedent’ to rule in his favor.”  Houston, 702 N.W.2d 
at 271 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993)). 
 43. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270. 
 44. A rule is considered “watershed” if it “‘requires the observance of those 
procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ or ‘alter our 
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the 
fairness of any particular conviction.’”  Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 270-71 (quoting 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). 
 45. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 273. 
 46. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313). 
 47. Id. at 274. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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elements,” which under Teague would require a new procedural 
rule to be construed as watershed.50  The court, however, declined 
to address this issue as it has not been explicitly addressed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.51 
III.   BACKGROUND 
A. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines are used to establish 
rational and consistent sentencing standards, which reduce 
sentencing disparity and ensure that sanctions following a 
conviction of a felony are proportional to the severity of the offense 
and the criminal history of the defendant.52  Minnesota utilizes a 
determinate sentencing model that now complies with the 
constitutional protections recognized in Blakely.53  One axis of the 
sentencing grid lists the severity of the offense, while the other axis 
lists the criminal history score of the defendant.54  The 
corresponding grid for these two points gives the sentencing judge 
a determinate range that must be used, absent any aggravating 
factors.55  A departure from the guidelines is permitted if 
aggravating or mitigating factors are found.56  As Blakely explained, 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § I (2004). 
 53. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, THE IMPACT OF BLAKELY V. 
WASHINGTON ON SENTENCING IN MINNESOTA §§ 3, 5 (2004). 
 54. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.A.-B. (2004). 
 55. Id. § II.C.-D. 
 56. Id. § II.D.  A non-exclusive list of mitigating factors used for a departure 
include: 
(1) The victim was an aggressor in the incident. 
(2) The offender played a minor or passive role in the crime or 
participated under circumstances of coercion or duress. 
(3) The offender, because of physical or mental impairment, lacked 
substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed.  The 
voluntary use of intoxicants (drugs or alcohol) does not fall within the 
purview of this factor. 
(4) The offender’s presumptive sentence is a commitment to the 
commissioner but not a mandatory minimum sentence, and either of the 
following exist: 
(a) The current conviction offense is at severity level I or II and 
the offender received all of his or her prior felony sentences 
during less than three separate court appearances; or 
(b) The current conviction offense is at severity level III or IV 
8
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it is not the aggravated departure from the guidelines that invokes 
a constitutional challenge, but the method by which the aggravated 
departure is given.57  When Blakely was decided, the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines left discretion to the sentencing judge, 
rather than the jury, to determine if an aggravated departure was 
appropriate.58 
In Minnesota, aggravated departures accounted for 
 
and the offender received all of his or her prior felony 
sentences during one court appearance. 
(5) Other substantial grounds exist which tend to excuse or mitigate the 
offender’s culpability, although not amounting to a defense. 
(6) Alternative placement for offender with serious and persistent mental 
illness . . . . 
Id. § II.D.2.a. 
  A non-exclusive list of aggravating factors used in an upward departure 
includes 
(1) The victim was particularly vulnerable due to age, infirmity, or 
reduced physical or mental capacity, which was known or should have 
been known to the offender. 
(2) The victim was treated with particular cruelty for which the individual 
offender should be held responsible. 
(3) The current conviction is for a Criminal Sexual Conduct offense or 
an offense in which the victim was otherwise injured and there is a prior 
felony conviction for a Criminal Sexual Conduct offense or an offense in 
which the victim was otherwise injured. 
(4) The offense was a major economic offense, identified as an illegal act 
or series of illegal acts committed by other than physical means and by 
concealment or guile to obtain money or property, to avoid payment or 
loss of money or property, or to obtain business or professional 
advantage. . . . 
(5) The offense was a major controlled substance offense, identified as 
an offense or series of offenses related to trafficking in controlled 
substances under circumstances more onerous than the usual offense. . . . 
(6) The offender committed, for hire, a crime against the person. 
(7) Offender is a “patterned sex offender” . . . . 
(8) Offender is a “dangerous offender who commits a third violent 
crime” . . . . 
(9) Offender is a “career offender” . . . . 
(10) The offender committed the crime as part of a group of three or 
more persons who all actively participated in the crime. 
(11) The offender intentionally selects the victim or the property against 
which the offense is committed, in whole or in part, because of the 
victim’s, the property owner’s or another’s actual or perceived race, 
color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, age, or national origin. 
(12) The offender’s use of another’s identity without authorization to 
commit a crime.  This aggravating factor may not be used when the use 
of another’s identity is an element of the offense. 
Id. § II.D.2.b. 
 57. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004). 
 58. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 53, §§ 3, 5. 
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approximately 7.7% of all felony sentences in 2002 (or 1002 of 
12,978).59  An aggravated departure in Minnesota can occur one of 
two ways.60  The first is an aggravated dispositional departure,61 
while the second is an aggravated durational departure.62  Out of 
the approximately 1000 cases per year that involved aggravated 
departures, and thus implicated Blakely issues, approximately 8% 
(seventy-nine) of the cases involved a trial.63 
B. Apprendi v. New Jersey 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the defendant fired several shots into 
the home of an African-American family.64  Apprendi pled guilty to 
two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful 
purpose,65 which carried a presumptive prison sentence of five to 
ten years.66  Although the count did not initially refer to New 
Jersey’s hate crime statute,67 as part of the plea agreement the State 
of New Jersey reserved the right to impose an enhanced sentence 
on the ground that the crime was committed with a biased 
purpose.68  In an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi’s actions were 
motivated by racial bias and “with a purpose to intimidate.”69  The 
 
 59. Id. § 4. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  An aggravated dispositional departure occurs when the defendant 
should have received a presumptive stayed sentence under the guidelines, but 
instead the court imposed a prison sentence.  Id. 
 62. Id.  An aggravated duration departure occurs when the offender receives 
a sentence length that is longer than the sentence recommended by the 
sentencing grid, regardless of whether the sentence is a presumptive stay or a 
presumptive prison sentence.  Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000). 
 65. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995). 
 66. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470; see § N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 
1995). 
 67. At the time New Jersey’s hate crime statute “provide[d] for an ‘extended 
term’ of imprisonment if the trial judge [found], by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that ‘the defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to 
intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, 
handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.’”  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468 
(quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 2000)).  The extended term 
authorized for second-degree offenses is imprisonment for between ten and 
twenty years.  Id. 
 68. Id. at 470.  Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the sentence 
enhancement on the ground that it violated the U.S. Constitution.  Id. 
 69. Id. at 471. 
10
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court sentenced Apprendi to an enhanced twelve-year term of 
imprisonment on the firearm charge.70  On appeal, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court upheld Apprendi’s sentence.71 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in a five-to-four ruling, stating “[o]ther than the fact of a 
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”72  The Court also 
stated that when the term “sentence enhancement” is used to 
describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory 
sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater 
offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict.73  
Therefore it fits as an element of the offense.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court concluded that Apprendi’s constitutional rights had been 
violated.74  The trial court had imposed a sentence greater than the 
maximum prescribed under the state law without a jury 
determining additional facts beyond a reasonable doubt that would 
warrant an upward sentencing departure.75 
C. Blakely v. Washington 
Four years after Apprendi, the U.S. Supreme Court handed 
down the decision of Blakely v. Washington.76  In Blakely, the 
defendant abducted his ex-wife at knifepoint and forced her into a 
wooden box in the back of his pickup truck.77  As soon as their 
thirteen-year-old son returned from school, Blakely ordered him to 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 472.  The court explained that due process only requires the State 
to prove the “elements” of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 472.  The 
fact that a state legislature “has placed a criminal component ‘within the 
sentencing provisions’ of the criminal code ‘does not mean that the finding of a 
biased purpose to intimidate is not an essential element of the offense.’”  Id. 
(quoting State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 492 (N.J. 1999)). 
 72. Id. at 490.  Apprendi did not render all presumptive sentences 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 481.  The Court stated that there is nothing 
unconstitutional about the trial court using various factors relating to the offense 
and offender to impose a sentence within the range prescribed by statute.  Id.  A 
Sixth Amendment problem occurs when the trial court makes a determination of 
a fact that leads to punishment exceeding the statutory maximum the defendant 
would have received based on facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.  Id. at 483. 
 73. Id. at 494 n.19. 
 74. Id. at 491-92. 
 75. Id. at 491-97. 
 76. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 77. Id. at 298. 
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follow in another car, threatening to do harm to his mother.78   
Blakely was eventually arrested in Montana.79  In a plea agreement, 
Blakely was charged with second-degree kidnapping involving 
domestic violence and use of a firearm.80  Blakely admitted no 
relevant facts other than the elements of the charges.81 
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended a sentence 
within the standard range of forty-nine to fifty-three months, 
pursuant to the Washington Sentencing Guidelines.82  The trial 
court departed from the presumptive sentence, and imposed an 
“exceptional” sentence of ninety months.83  The trial court justified 
this sentence on the ground that Blakely acted with “deliberate 
cruelty,” which is a statutorily enumerated ground for departure in 
the state of Washington.84 
After all appeals were affirmed through the Washington 
Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.85  
While the U.S. Supreme Court applied the holding in Apprendi,86 it 
further defined what was meant by the term “statutory maximum.”87  
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.; see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.40.030(1), 10.99.020(3)(p), 9.94A.125 
(2000). 
 81. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299. 
 82. Id. at 300.  State law in Washington provided that “[n]o person convicted 
of a [class B] felony shall be punished by confinement . . . exceeding . . . a term of 
ten years.”  Id. at 299 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(1)(b) (2000)).  
Furthermore, other provisions limited the range of sentences a judge may impose.  
Id.  The offense to which Blakely pled guilty carried a presumptive range of forty-
nine to fifty-three months.  Id. at 300. 
 83. Id.  “A judge may impose a sentence above the standard range if he finds 
‘substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.’”  Id. at 299 
(quoting WASH REV. CODE § 9.94A.120(2) (2000)).  If a judge imposes an 
exceptional sentence, he must make specific findings of fact and conclusions of 
law supporting the departure.  Id. 
 84. Id. at 299; see WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (2000).  The trial 
court made the following findings of fact with regard to aggravating factors: 
The defendant’s methods were more homogeneous than his motive.  He 
used stealth and surprise, and took advantage of the victim’s isolation.  
He immediately employed physical violence, restrained the victim with 
tape, and threatened her with injury and death to herself and others.  He 
immediately coerced the victim into providing information by the 
threatening application of a knife.  He violated a subsisting restraining 
order. 
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301. 
 85. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301. 
 86. See supra Part III.B. (explaining Apprendi’s holding). 
 87. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04. 
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Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose 
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant.”88  Therefore, the trial court could not have imposed a 
ninety-month sentence based only on the facts the defendant had 
admitted in the guilty plea.89  The trial court imposed a ninety-
month sentence based on substantial and compelling aggravating 
factors not admitted by Blakely.90  Because these factors were not 
submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
Blakely’s sentence was rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court.91  The Court stressed that this ruling did not render 
determinate sentencing schemes unconstitutional; rather Blakely 
held that these sentencing schemes were unconstitutional in the 
way they were applied.92 
D. Reaction from Other States with Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines 
At the time the Apprendi and Blakely decisions were handed 
down, Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Tennessee 
all employed a sentencing system based on presumptive guidelines 
that involved judicial fact-finding in some form.93  This Part 
illustrates measures these states have taken in order to comply with 
Apprendi and Blakely’s Sixth Amendment interpretation. 
1. Kansas 
The Kansas Sentencing Guidelines provided a range for 
sentencing based on the severity level of the offense and the 
defendant’s criminal history score.94  Before Apprendi and Blakely, 
the State was able to move for an upward departure sentence based 
 
 88. Id. at 303.  The Court further explained statutory maximum when it 
stated “[i]n other words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he 
may impose without any additional findings.”  Id. at 303-04. 
 89. Id. at 304.  Blakely did not admit any other relevant information besides 
the elements of the offenses in the guilty plea.  Id. at 299. 
 90. See id. at 304. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 308. 
 93. See infra Parts III.D.1.-4. 
 94. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4704 (2000).  The vertical axis of the sentencing 
guidelines grid is the crime severity scale while the horizontal axis is based on the 
defendant’s criminal history score.  § 21-4704(c).  The presumptive guideline 
would be found at the meeting place of these two factors.  § 21-4704(e)(1). 
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on a list of non-exclusive aggravating factors.95  The statute 
provided that if a sentencing judge found substantial and 
compelling reasons based on aggravating factors present, the judge 
would be able to initiate an upward departure from the sentencing 
guidelines.96 
In applying Apprendi, Kansas determined that having a judge, 
rather than a jury, make the findings of aggravating factors violated 
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.97  The court in State v. 
Gould stated that the statute was silent on any burden of proof to be 
utilized by the district judge to establish a substantial and 
compelling reason to depart from the presumptive guidelines.98  
Because of this, an upward departure from the sentencing 
guidelines required less evidentiary weight than facts asserted for 
conviction.99  The Gould court held that the Kansas sentencing 
scheme was unconstitutional on its face and therefore invalid.100 
In 2002, the Kansas Legislature amended its sentencing 
procedures.101  The new legislation required that any fact that 
would increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory 
maximum, other than a prior conviction, must be submitted to a 
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.102  If evidence 
presented warrants an increased penalty, the court will conduct a 
separate departure sentence proceeding before a trial jury.103 
2. North Carolina 
In 1993, North Carolina enacted the Structured Sentencing 
Act, which required sentencing judges to impose a minimum and 
maximum active, intermediate, or community punishment for 
felony convictions.104  Ranges for possible minimum sentences were 
 
 95. § 21-4716(c)(1). 
 96. § 21-4716(b)(2).  An upward departure was limited by a “double-double 
rule” which prohibited a sentence to exceed twice the maximum presumptive 
imprisonment term of the departure sentence following aggravation.  § 21-
4720(c)(3). 
 97. State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan. 2001). 
 98. Id. at 812. 
 99. Id. (citing State v. Spain, 953 P.2d 1004 (Kan. 1998)). 
 100. Id. at 814. 
 101. 21 Kan. Reg. 869 (June 6, 2002). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.13 (2003).  The length of term imposed 
depended on the offense class, defendant’s prior record, and whether aggravating 
or mitigating factors were present.  State v. Allen, 615 S.E.2d 256, 261 (N.C. 2005); 
14
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set forth on every combination of offense class and prior-record 
level.105  The sentencing judge would consider what aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances existed and select an appropriate 
punishment range.106  Like Kansas, a non-exclusive list of 
aggravating and mitigating factors was statutorily enumerated.107  
The State was required to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that aggravating factors existed, while the defense was 
required to prove mitigating factors by the same standard.108  
Regardless, the decision to depart from the presumptive range was 
entirely in the trial judge’s discretion.109 
To meet Apprendi’s requirements, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court held that facts supporting an enhanced sentence must be 
submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.110  The 
court further stated that “in every instance where the state seeks an 
enhanced sentence pursuant to [North Carolina General Statutes 
section] 15A-1340.16A, it must allege statutory factors supporting 
the enhancement in an indictment.”111  Following the State v. Lucas 
decision, North Carolina amended its statute so that trial judges 
were no longer permitted to find facts supporting an enhanced 
sentence.112 
After the Blakely decision further defined the term “statutory 
maximum,” the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled its 
decision in Lucas.113  In State v. Allen, the court held that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial only affected the portions of the 
North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act which permit a 
sentencing judge to impose an aggravated sentence based on the 
 
see also §§ 15A-1340.13, -1340.14, -1340.16, -1340.17.  The minimum statutory 
punishment chart displayed a grid where offense classes and prior record level 
were the axes.  Allen, 615 S.E.2d at 261; see also § 15A-1340.17(c).  Maximum 
sentences corresponded to every minimum sentence and were listed on separate 
tables.  Allen, 615 S.E.2d at 261; see also § 15A-1340.17(d)-(e1). 
 105. § 15A-1340.17(c).  Ranges are presumptive, mitigated in less severe cases, 
or aggravated in the worst cases.  Id. 
 106. § 15A-1340.16(a)-(c). 
 107. § 15A-1340.16(d)-(e).  The prosecutor and defendant were entitled to 
present any evidence of other factors that were reasonably related to the purposes 
of sentencing.  § 15A-1340.16(d)(20), (e)(21). 
 108. Allen, 615 S.E.2d at 261; see also § 15A-1340.16(a). 
 109. Allen, 615 S.E.2d at 261; see also § 15A-1340.16(a), (b). 
 110. State v. Lucas, 548 S.E.2d 712, 731 (N.C. 2001), overruled by Allen, 615 
S.E.2d 256. 
 111. Id. (emphasis added). 
 112. Allen, 615 S.E.2d at 264 n.4. 
 113. Id. at 265. 
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existence of aggravating factors not admitted by a defendant or 
found by a jury.114  Allen determined that Blakely is not implicated 
when a judge determines the presence of mitigating factors or 
when a judge balances aggravating and mitigating factors.115  These 
determinations do not affect the statutorily defined maximum 
sentence as explained in Blakely.116 
3. Oregon 
Like North Carolina, “Oregon law provide[d] that ‘the 
sentencing judge shall impose the presumptive sentence . . . unless 
the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to impose a 
departure.’”117  Prior to Apprendi and Blakely, an erroneous sentence 
was one that exceeded the presumptive guidelines without the 
sentencing judge making the required additional findings.118  
Therefore, if a defendant was sentenced to thirty-six months when 
the presumptive guidelines called for eighteen months, that 
sentence was erroneous only if the sentencing judge did not make 
any findings explaining the departure.119  The Oregon Supreme 
Court realized that this was the exact problem that Blakely was 
trying to remedy.120  Instead of ruling the Oregon sentencing 
guidelines unconstitutional, the Oregon Supreme Court stated that 
the guidelines were applied in an unconstitutional way.121  The 
court left it to the state legislature to determine what the best 
course of action would be.122 
Oregon currently has legislation pending that will amend the 
unconstitutional portions of the sentencing statutes.123  The 
pending amendments allow the court to impose a sentence outside 
the presumptive sentence or range if the court “determines, in the 
exercise of the court’s discretion, that a different sentence is more 
appropriate.”124  Furthermore, the guidelines adopted under 
 
 114. Id. at 266. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. State v. Dilts, 103 P.3d 95, 99 (Or. 2004) (quoting OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-
0001 (1996)) (emphasis omitted).  The presumptive guidelines were determined 
by Oregon Revised Statutes section 137.669 (2004). 
 118. Dilts, 103 P.3d at 99. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 100. 
 122. See id. 
 123. 2005 Oregon H.B. No. 2975, 73rd Leg. Ass. (Or. 2005). 
 124. Id. 
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section 137.667 are now advisory rather than mandatory.125 
4. Tennessee 
In State v. Gomez,126 the Tennessee Supreme Court determined 
that the Apprendi and Blakely decisions did not affect the state’s 
sentencing scheme.127  Under the Tennessee Sentencing Reform 
Act, the trial court has discretion to select an appropriate sentence 
within a predetermined statutory range.128  The sentencing judge, 
however, has no authority to impose a sentence outside this 
statutory range.129  There is no provision in the Tennessee 
Sentencing Reform Act that mandates an increase in a defendant’s 
sentence upon the judicial finding of an enhancement factor.130  If 
a trial court determines that there are aggravating factors present, 
the trial court “may set the sentence above the minimum but still 
within the appropriate range.”131 
The Tennessee Supreme Court stated that although the 
sentencing guidelines contain mandatory language, that language 
loses its mandatory effect because the statute directs the judge to 
enhance and mitigate within the range given.132  Because the 
Tennessee Sentencing Reform Act authorizes a discretionary, non-
mandatory sentencing procedure rather than a formula, grid, or 
other mechanical, mandatory procedure, it does not violate a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.133 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005). 
 127. Id. at 661.  The Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (1) 
divides felonies into five classifications according to the seriousness of the offense, 
(2) separates offenders into five classifications according to the number of prior 
convictions, (3) assigns a range of years for each class of crime committed by each 
class of offenders, and (4) uses the enhancement and mitigating factors to assess 
the definite sentence within each range.  Id. at 658; see also TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-
35-105 to -114 (2003). 
 128. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d at 659. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210 provides that the 
presumptive sentence for a Class B, C, D, and E felony shall be the minimum 
sentence in the range if there are no enhancement or mitigating factors.  Id.  The 
presumptive sentence for a class A felony shall be the midpoint of the range if 
there are no enhancement or mitigating factors.  Id. 
 131. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-210 Sentencing Commission Comments (2003).  
A sentencing judge must start at the minimum sentence in that range, enhance 
the sentence within that range as appropriate for the enhancement factors, then 
reduce the sentence within that range as appropriate for mitigating factors.  Id. 
 132. See Gomez, 163 S.W.3d at 660. 
 133. Id. at 661. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
A. Will Shattuck Present an Ex Post Facto Problem? 
Shattuck rendered Minnesota Statutes section 609.109, 
subdivision 4 unconstitutional in its entirety, because it could not 
be applied without a sentencing provision.134  While Shattuck was 
pending, the Minnesota Legislature amended the unconstitutional 
provisions in statutes that required judicial factfinding.135  Because 
the Shattuck court did not express an opinion on how Shattuck 
could be sentenced upon remand,136 it left open a possible defense 
for Shattuck: that the State is applying laws ex post facto to 
Shattuck and others similarly situated. 
Article I, section 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits a State 
from passing any ex post facto law.137  An ex post facto law is any 
statute which punishes as a crime an act that was innocent when 
done; makes a punishment more burdensome; or which deprives 
one charged with a crime of any defense available according to law 
when the act was committed.138  The bar against ex post facto laws 
protects a citizen against a previously committed act being charged 
as a crime, when that act was considered innocent conduct at the 
time of commission.139  The bar also prevents oppressive legislation, 
but at the same time does not handicap legislative control of 
remedies and procedural laws which do not affect citizens 
substantively.140  A procedural change in the law is not ex post facto, 
regardless of the fact that it may be disadvantageous to the 
defendant.141 
1. Procedural Versus Substantive: Dobbert v. Florida 
In Dobbert v. Florida, the defendant was sentenced under a 
statute which provided that a person convicted of a capital felony 
 
 134. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 135. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 136. See State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 148 n.16 (Minn. 2005). 
 137. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977).  Article I, section 11 of the 
Minnesota Constitution also prohibits the passage of ex post facto laws.   
 138. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-170 (1925). 
 139. See Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 292-93. 
 140. Id. at 293. 
 141. Id.; see Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (change in statute was not ex 
post facto when it merely altered who could and could not be called as witnesses in 
trials, even though the change was disadvantageous to the defendant in the case). 
18
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was to be punished by death unless the jury verdict included a 
recommendation of mercy by a majority of the jury.142  If mercy was 
found, the defendant would be sentenced to life imprisonment.143  
The Florida Supreme Court had previously ruled that the 1971 
Florida death penalty statutes were unconstitutional based on the 
U.S. Supreme Court case of Furman v. Georgia.144  Florida then 
enacted a new death penalty procedure in which a jury renders an 
advisory decision on punishment, not binding on the court, based 
upon aggravating and mitigating circumstances relevant to the 
case.145  If the sentencing court imposes a sentence of death, a 
written finding must be made illustrating the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances considered by the judge.146  All death 
sentences are also subject to an automatic priority review by the 
Florida Supreme Court.147 
Dobbert first argued that the change in the role of the judge 
and jury in the death penalty statute between the time of his crime 
and conviction deprived him of a substantive right to have a jury 
determine whether or not the death penalty should be imposed, 
thus constituting an ex post facto violation.148  Dobbert’s second 
claim was that because the 1971 death penalty statute was rendered 
unconstitutional, there was no death penalty in effect at the time 
he committed his crime.149 
The Supreme Court denied Dobbert’s first claim, stating that 
the change in the death penalty law was clearly procedural.150  The 
Court reasoned that the new statute altered how the death penalty 
was going to be imposed, not the degree of proof necessary to 
establish his guilt.151  Speculation that the jury would have 
recommended life was unpersuasive.152  Furthermore, the Court 
reasoned that the new statute actually offers more protection for 
defendants, not less.153  The death penalty was presumed under the 
 
 142. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 288 n.3. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 288 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Donaldson v. 
Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972)). 
 145. Id. at 289. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 292. 
 149. Id. at 297. 
 150. Id. at 293. 
 151. See id. at 294. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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old statute, only to be overruled by a majority of the jury 
recommending mercy.154  The new Florida statute required a judge 
to impose the death penalty only after making a written finding 
indicating insufficient mitigating factors necessary to outweigh 
aggravating ones.155  Even after findings are made, the decision is 
still subject to review by the Florida Supreme Court.156  Viewing the 
statutory changes in their totality, the Court determined that the 
amendments were procedural, and also offered the defendant 
more significant safeguards, and therefore were not ex post facto.157 
Dobbert’s second claim was also denied by the Court.158  The 
Court determined that “[t]he actual existence of a statute, prior to 
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact 
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.”159  
The existence of a capital punishment statute served as an 
“operative fact” to warn the defendants of a penalty which will be 
imposed if a capital crime is committed.160  This satisfies the ex post 
facto provision of the U.S. Constitution.161 
2.  Dobbert Applied to Shattuck 
Shattuck, and others similarly situated, could make the same 
arguments that Dobbert presented to the U.S. Supreme Court by 
challenging that Minnesota is applying either a substantive change 
in law that makes his defense more burdensome, or that there was 
no constitutionally valid Career Sex Offender Statute.  If a 
challenge is made, the Minnesota Supreme Court will have to 
determine whether requiring a jury, rather than a trial court, to 
make factual findings regarding aggravated departures is a 
procedural or substantive change.  If the court finds the change 
procedural rather than substantive, no ex post argument can be 
made. 
As displayed in Dobbert, a change in the sentencing process 
does not change the facts required to find guilt.  The same amount 
of proof will be necessary to determine if a defendant is guilty of 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 295. 
 157. Id. at 294-97. 
 158. Id. at 298. 
 159. Id. (quoting Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 
371, 374 (1940)). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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the underlying crime.  In Shattuck’s case, the court found four 
aggravating factors: (1) the victim was particularly vulnerable, (2) 
the victim was treated with particular cruelty, (3) the victim 
suffered great emotional harm, and (4) the assault was planned.162  
These factors do not determine if Shattuck was guilty of either first-
degree criminal sexual conduct or kidnapping with great bodily 
harm.163  Furthermore, the change in the statute does not alter the 
aggravating factors required to impose Minnesota’s Career Sex 
Offender Statute, the amendment just changes how the statute will 
be imposed.164 
Much like the statute amendment in Dobbert, the amendment 
to the Minnesota Career Sex Offender statute will afford more 
protection to defendants rather than less.165  Statutes are 
invalidated by the Apprendi and Blakely decisions because they do 
not offer sufficient protection under the Sixth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.  Before the Minnesota Legislature amended the 
Career Sex Offender Statute, the trial court had to find that 
aggravating factors were more likely than not.166  Changes in 
violating statutes require that aggravating factors offered by the 
prosecution be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.167  This stricter burden of proof offers more protection to 
defendants, not less. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court will likely follow Dobbert and 
rule that the amendments made by the Minnesota Legislature, 
which now require a jury rather than a trial court to determine the 
presence of aggravating factors, are procedural.  The amendments 
do not change the requirements needed to convict for the 
underlying offense, while providing the defendant more protection 
under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
B. Does Houston Change the Bedrock Procedural Elements of Criminal 
Procedure? 
Houston further claimed that the Apprendi line of cases 
requires that all sentencing factors that increase the penalty beyond 
the punishment available based solely on the jury verdict or guilty 
 
 162. State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 134-35 (Minn. 2005). 
 163. See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342, .25 (2004). 
 164. See S.F. No. 2273, 84th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2005). 
 165. See id. 
 166. See MINN. STAT. § 609.109. 
 167. See S.F. No. 2273, 84th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2005). 
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plea must be treated as underlying elements of the offense.168  
Houston argued that because elements of an offense must be 
placed in the charging instrument, submitted to a jury, and found 
beyond a reasonable doubt, treating sentencing factors as elements 
implicates “bedrock procedural elements” required by Teague to 
construe a new procedural rule as watershed, mandating full 
retroactive effect.169  The court, however, declined to address this 
issue as it has not been explicitly addressed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.170 
1. Retroactivity and Bedrock Procedural Elements 
Recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals determined the 
retroactivity of State v. Modtland171 in Erickson v. State.172  Modtland 
had changed the three-step probation revocation rule, known as 
the Austin factors.173  In order to revoke probation the court had to 
(1) designate the specific condition that was violated, (2) find the 
violation was intentional or inexcusable, and (3) find that the need 
for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.174  
Erickson appealed his probation revocation because the trial court 
did not expressly make Austin findings.175  Before Modtland, the 
courts applied a “sufficient evidence exception” when courts did 
not make express findings on the Austin factors.176  If the court did 
not make Austin findings, it would not be considered an abuse of 
discretion if the record contained “sufficient evidence” to warrant 
the revocation.177  Modtland eliminated the sufficient evidence 
exception, thus requiring the trial court to determine the three 
Austin factors on the record before probation can be revoked.178  
Modtland was not released at the time the trial court in Erickson 
revoked Erickson’s probation without making express Austin 
findings.179 
 
 168. State v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2005). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. 695 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 2005). 
 172. 702 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
 173. Id. at 895-96. 
 174. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). 
 175. Erickson, 702 N.W.2d at 895. 
 176. Id. at 895-896. 
 177. State v. Theel, 532 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 178. Erickson, 702 N.W.2d at 896. 
 179. Id. 
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The Minnesota Court of Appeals did not believe that the rule 
expressed in Modtland altered the bedrock procedural elements 
exception required by Teague to apply the case retroactively.180  The 
court stated that “[t]he Modtland rule merely requires the district 
court to place the Austin findings on the record.”181  This does not 
change the discretion allowed to the district court in weighing 
factors or making the ultimate decision of revoking or continuing 
the defendant’s probation.182  Because it does not require 
procedures that implicate the fundamental fairness of a trial, the 
Modtland rule was not applied retroactively.183 
2. Applying Erickson to Houston 
In order for Blakely to apply to Houston, Blakely must change 
the bedrock procedural elements of criminal procedure.  Because 
of Apprendi and Blakely, aggravating factors found in a crime must 
be placed in the charge if they are to be presented for an upward 
departure.  Placing these factors as elements in the initial charge is 
dissimilar to the Erickson case requiring courts to place Austin 
findings on the record to determine probation revocation. 
Apprendi stated that a sentence enhancement describes any 
increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence for a 
given crime.184  A sentence enhancement is the functional 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense because it gives a 
defendant notice that he or she may be given a greater punishment 
based on aggravating element(s).  The court in Erickson stated that 
the Austin factors placed in the record do not alter the discretion 
courts have in determining that probation should or should not be 
revoked.185  Conversely, placing aggravating factors in the initial 
charge as required by the Apprendi cases does change the 
determination of what offense a defendant may be charged with. 
Depending on the aggravating factors in a case, a defendant 
may be charged as a career offender, resulting in a much longer 
sentence in the state of Minnesota.186  If these elements are not 
presented in the charge, because of Apprendi and Blakely, a 
 
 180. Id. at 897. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000). 
 185. Erickson, 702 N.W.2d at 897. 
 186. See MINN. STAT. § 609.109 (2004). 
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defendant cannot be charged with the upward departure.  This 
requirement could be viewed by Minnesota courts as a bedrock 
procedural change affecting the fundamental fairness of a trial, 
allowing defendants to use Apprendi and Blakely on collateral review. 
Aggravating factors, however, are not necessary to alter the 
guilt or innocence of a defendant for the underlying offense.  For 
example, elements required to convict a defendant for first-degree 
criminal sexual conduct are not based upon whether or not the 
victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable.187  Furthermore, a 
career sex offender provision cannot be applied unless there is an 
underlying criminal sexual offense.188  Thus, Houston is similar to 
Erickson if a court focuses solely on the underlying crime rather 
than a judge’s ability to find aggravating factors that enhance a 
sentence.  Aggravating factors do not alter the discretion a court 
has in making the ultimate decision of a defendant’s guilt and 
therefore do not implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is very apparent that Apprendi and Blakely have changed 
criminal sentencing in this country.  Each state that employs 
presumptive sentencing guidelines will eventually determine the 
magnitude of that change.  The Minnesota courts have been a 
leader in combating sentencing confusion in defining what 
Apprendi and Blakely mean to their presumptive guidelines.  The 
recent decisions of Shattuck and Houston may muddy the waters that 
the Minnesota Supreme Court has attempted to clear.  These 
decisions raise issues of ex post facto legislation, which Minnesota 
Statutes section 609.109 likely is not, and retroactive application of 




 187. See id. § 609.342. 
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